MARKETFIELD
ASSET MANAGEMENT

MARKETFIELD FUND OCTOBER 31, 2011

FUND OVERVIEW

OBJECTIVE

The investment objective of the Fund is capital appreciation. We endeavor to accomplish this by seeking low-volatility absolute return in excess of broad equity indexes.

STRATEGY & PROCESS

The Fund attempts to provide returns on capital substantially in excess of the risk-free rate rather than matching any particular index or external benchmark. The Fund has a broad investment charter that allows it to utilize equity securities, fixed-income instruments, commodities, futures and options. Additionally, with respect to 50% of the Fund's net assets, the Fund may engage in short sales of index-related and other equity securities to reduce its equity exposure or to profit from an anticipated decline in the price of the security sold short.

FUND FACTS

FUND STATISTICS

Ticker Symbol ....MFLDX
CUSIP 89833W865
Minimum Investment...$2,500
Inception Date 7/31/07
Benchmark ....S&P 500 Index
Net Assets...$758M
Number of Holdings 80

TOP TEN LONG HOLDINGS (AS OF 10/31/11)

IShares Russell 2000 Index ETF 3.25%
Costco Wholesale Corp. 2.56%
W.W. Grainger Inc. 2.55%
McDonald's Corp. 2.36%
Google Inc. 2.27%
International Business Machine 2.07%
Colgate–Palmolive Co. 1.94%
SPDR S&P Retail ETF 1.94%
Fast Retailing Co., Ltd. (Tokyo) 1.91%
Hershey Company 1.89%
TOTAL: 22.74%

PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION

Equity Portfolio Long...76%
Equity Portfolio Short 31%
Futures Short .... – 2%

Futures allocation reflect notional value (the value of the futures' underlying).

★★★★★ OVERALL MORNINGSTAR RATING™
AMONG 69 LONG-SHORT EQUITY FUNDS AS OF 10/31/11

Ratings are based on risk-adjusted return. The Overall Morningstar Rating for a fund is derived from a weighted average of the performance figures associated with its 3 year Morningstar Rating metrics.

FUND PERFORMANCE

AS OF QUARTER-END 9/30/11 | AS OF MONTH-END 10/31/11

		Since Inception*		Cumulative			Annualized		
	1 Year Annualized	Annualized	Cumulative	1 Month	YTD	Since Inception*	1 Year	3 Year	Since Inception*
MFLDX	+4.81%	+6.74%	+31.21%	+3.97%	+0.67%	+36.42%	+5.18%	+13.22%	+7.58%
S&P 500	+1.14%	– 3.77%	– 14.78%	+10.93%	+1.30%	– 5.47%	+8.09%	+11.41%	– 1.31%

*Since inception date 7/31/07

Gross Expense Ratio 2.43%
**Net Expense Ratio 2.54%
***Operating Expense Cap 1.75%

Source: U.S. Bancorp ©

***The net expense ratio includes dividends and interest expense on short positions, & the recoupment of previously waived expenses.*
**** The Adviser has agreed to waive its management fees and/or to reimburse expenses of the Fund to ensure that total Annual Fund Operating Expenses (exclusive of taxes, leverage, interest, brokerage commissions, expenses incurred in connection with any merger or reorganization, dividends on short positions, acquired fund fees and expenses and extraordinary or non-recurring expenses, such as litigation) do not exceed 1.75% of the Fund's average annual net assets, at least through August 31, 2012 and for an indefinite period thereafter.*

Performance reflects the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings and is net of advisory fees. Performance data quoted represents past performance; past performance does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor's shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. Current performance of the Fund may be lower or higher than the performance quoted. Performance data to the most recent month end may be obtained by calling (888) 236-4298. The Fund imposes a redemption fee of 1.00% for shares held less than 60 days. Performance data quoted does not reflect the redemption fee. If reflected, total return would be reduced.

TOP FIVE SECTORS — NET

Consumer Discretionary 21.62%
Industrial 16.35%
Consumer Staples 11.47%
Technology 9.86%
Energy 8.69%

Fund holdings and/or sector allocations are subject to change at any time and are not recommendations to buy or sell any security.

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MARKETFIELD
ASSET MANAGEMENT

MANAGEMENT TEAM

Michael C. Aronstein
President, Chief Executive Officer,
and Portfolio Manager

Michael C. Aronstein is Portfolio Manager of the Marketfield Fund. He is also Chief Investment Strategist for Oscar Gruss & Son Incorporated, a NYSE member firm that provides research and investment advice to institutional managers. Prior to joining Oscar Gruss in 2004, Mr. Aronstein was Chief Investment Strategist at Preservation Group, a provider of independent macroeconomic and strategic advice to professional investors. Mr. Aronstein began his investment career in 1979 at Merrill Lynch, serving positions as Senior Market Analyst, Senior Investment Strategist, and Manager of Global Investment Strategy. Mr. Aronstein spent six years as President of Comstock Partners, a diversified investment advisor, and left to found West Course Capital, a discretionary commodity management firm. Mr. Aronstein graduated from Yale College with a Bachelor of Arts in 1974. His views on macroeconomic and strategic issues are regularly sought by and disseminated through the financial print and visual media. Mr. Aronstein manages $758 million in MFLDX and $387 million in The Marketfield Fund, Ltd.; total assets under management are $1,145 million.

Michael Shaoul
Chairman

Michael Shaoul also serves as Chief Executive Officer of Oscar Gruss and Son Incorporated, a position he has held since December 2001. He joined Oscar Gruss in 1996 as Chief Operating Officer. Between 1992 and 1996, Mr. Shaoul ran Park Square Associates, a Manhattan-based real estate investment and management company. He was awarded a Ph.D. in Accounting and Finance in 1992 from Manchester University (UK). Mr. Shaoul has written articles on behalf of *Barron's* and has been regularly quoted in *The Wall Street Journal* and *Dow Jones Newswires* regarding his opinions on the investment markets.

Myles D. Gillespie
Chief Operating Officer

Myles D. Gillespie joined Marketfield Asset Management as Chief Operating Officer in 2007. Mr. Gillespie is a graduate of The Hotchkiss School and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from Franklin and Marshall College (Class of 1983). From 1983 to 1986, he worked as a stock index futures trader with Henderson Brothers and in 1986 became a NYSE Specialist at Quick & Reilly. He was appointed Executive Vice President of JJC Specialist Corp., the successor firm to Quick and Reilly, in 1989. In 1999 he became President of Fleet Specialist, Inc., the successor firm to JJC Specialist Corp., retiring from this position in 2004. During his time at the NYSE, Mr. Gillespie served as a NYSE floor Official (1993-1999) and NYSE floor Governor (2001-2004).



David C. Johnson, Jr.
Director of Research

Mr. Johnson joined Marketfield Asset Management, LLC as Director of Research in April 2011. Mr. Johnson is a graduate of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He received his MBA in 1984 from Darden School of Business, University of Virginia. Prior to joining Marketfield, Mr. Johnson was an investment analyst, portfolio manager, and head of business development at Wilkinson O'Grady & Co., Inc. He spent the first ten years of his career in the fixed-income department of Salomon Brothers, where he managed one of its primary sales groups. Mr. Johnson was president of Preservation Group, where he worked closely with Mr. Aronstein.

Mutual fund investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible. The Fund invests in smaller companies, which involve additional risks such as limited liquidity and greater volatility. The Fund invests in foreign securities which involve greater volatility and political, economic and currency risks and differences in accounting methods. These risks are greater for investments in emerging markets. Investments in debt securities typically decrease in value when interest rates rise. This risk is usually greater for longer-term debt securities. Investment by the Fund in lower-rated and non-rated securities presents a greater risk of loss to principal and interest than higher-rated securities. Investments in asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities involve additional risks such as credit risk, prepayment risk, possible illiquidity and default, and increased susceptibility to adverse economic developments. The Fund regularly makes short sales of securities, which involves the risk that losses may exceed the original amount invested, however a mutual fund investor's risk is limited to the amount invested in a fund. The Fund may also use options and futures contracts, which have the risks of unlimited losses of the underlying holdings due to unanticipated market movements and failure to correctly predict the direction of securities prices, interest rates and currency exchange rates. The investment in options is not suitable for all investors. Investments in absolute return strategies are not intended to outperform stocks and bonds during strong market rallies. ***The Fund's investment objectives, risks, charges and expenses must be considered carefully before investing. The statutory and summary prospectuses contains this and other important information about the investment company, and may be obtained by calling (888) 236-4298. Read carefully before investing.***

*The S&P 500 Index (SPX) is a broad-based unmanaged index of 500 stocks, which is widely recognized as representative of the equity market in general. The securities holdings and volatility of the Fund differ significantly from the stocks that make up the SPX. You cannot invest directly in an index.
Cash flow measures the cash generating capability of a company by adding non-cash charges (e.g. depreciation) and interest expense to pretax income.

 For each fund with at least a three-year history, Morningstar calculates a Morningstar Rating™ (based on a Morningstar Risk Adjusted Return measure that accounts for variation in a fund's monthly performance, including the effects of sales charges, loads, and redemption fees), placing more emphasis on downward variations and rewarding consistent performance. The top 10% of funds in each category receive 5 stars, the next 22.5% receive 4 stars, the next 35% receive 3 stars, the ext 22.5% receive 2 stars and the bottom 10% receive 1 star. (Each share class is counted as a fraction of one fund within this scale and rated separately, which may cause slight variations in the distribution percentages.) The Marketfield Fund received 5 stars among 69 Long-Short Equity Funds for the three-year period ending 10/31/2011.

The Marketfield Fund is advised by Marketfield Asset Management and distributed by Quasar Distributors, LLC. Quasar Distributors is not affiliated with Sincere & Co., LLC.

COMMENTARY

It has been just about one year since a popular bank analyst came forward with an elaborate and heavily publicized opinion regarding the risks of catastrophic rates of default in municipal bond markets. As is often the case, the distribution of that dire view throughout the mass media marked a low point in the market. The episode provides another clear example of the differences between actually managing money and simply talking about it. Apart from a little damage to the ego, mistakes made in the broadcast booth rather than on the field are of little lasting consequence to the perpetrators.

The general thrust of the concern about municipal finance was, from our perspective, accurate, if poorly timed. The municipalities that actually suffered financial embarrassment over the past year just happened to be located several thousand miles east, rather than west, of Wall Street.

The recent upheaval in European sovereign debt markets is part of a much larger secular trend involving the forced restructuring of governments as economic entities. The eighty-year experiment with Keynesian adventurism is coming to an end. After decades of profligacy, governments' creditworthiness has run up against the harsh reality of arithmetic.

Discipline imposed by capital markets is a more painful path to sound finance than a voluntary program of prudent fiscal policy. Choices made under emergency conditions, as is the case in much of Europe, tend to involve less careful consideration. Often, though, it takes a full-fledged emergency to prompt leaders who have become used to the privilege of borrowing and spending other people's money without limit to change their ways, or failing this to have their position of power taken from them.

The long, worldwide process of restructuring government finances is a source of both hope and concern for us. The hope derives from our belief that governments' roles within economic processes should be as limited as possible, particularly when involved to redirection of capital flows for the purposes of political leaders rather than for the purposes of those who actually generate the capital. The idea that the Italian, Greek, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Belgian governments will not be able to borrow and spend in the manner to which they have become accustomed is a good thing. So too in the cases of California, Illinois, New York and other profligate states.

Our main concerns are centered around the political and social responses once the constraints imposed by markets become clearly understood. The futility of rioting and strikes by a portion of the Greek population does nothing to deter them. The fact is that they are fighting over monies that are gone. Should the Greek public sector unions succeed in seizing control of the treasury, they will find that it is a dry well.

Once the realization dawns that there is not much in the vault to divide up, the process of settling accounts becomes entirely political. When governments lose the wherewithal to satisfy their obligations to creditors and others to whom they are obliged, the ordination of priorities becomes a political matter. Every constituency believes that the government's promises to them are sacrosanct.

In discussions pertaining to the risks in municipal bond markets (which we believe to be considerable) we have heard that no state would ever restructure its bond obligations or alter the terms of its pension promises to municipal workers, or renegotiate union contracts. In many instances, all of these payments have been enshrined in the state's constitution as inviolable. And yet, when the money runs out because markets finally balk, constitutional promises matter little. That is the example of Greece. They can fight all they want over who is entitled to the greatest share of nothing.

The process of apportioning pain once the ability of governments to borrow everything they want is undermined by markets is not pleasant. We are seeing the beginnings of it in the U.S., with state and municipal unions supporting disruptive gatherings in cities across the country, with the ultimate aim of raising taxes enough to obviate the need to balance budgets through expenditure cuts involving reduced pay and benefits for public sector employees.

Battle lines are being drawn between those who support government through the provision of tax payments and those who benefit directly from the flow of taxes and borrowed funds handed out by political leaders. This is the basis of a sharper divide and greater antagonism in our political processes.

There is a certain irony in the fact that in states like California, the agendas of public sector workers and their unions are almost entirely dependent upon the willingness of the very wealthy to continue to buy the bonds of a state in which they are held in scorn. If California's rich come to realize that by buying tax free bonds they are self-identifying as members of the class from whom the recipients of the bond proceeds

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wish to extract more and more wealth, California will be a less ancient version of Greece in short order.

Therein lay our greatest concerns. If a state gets into real hot water as a result of an inability to issue more debt at rates that are manageable, the natural response of those who have enjoyed the generosity of that state's spending will be to call for a restructuring of the existing debt and the infliction of the financial pain upon its owners, who, by definition, are rich enough to need tax exempt bonds.

This path would clearly mark a new and dangerous phase in the secular decline in credit that we are currently experiencing. The hope is that all political bodies in the U.S. come to some realization that it is far better to restrain expenditure and long-term promises volitionally than to be forced by markets. We are encouraged that many states and many citizens seem to have gotten the message. There even seems to be a somewhat serious first step being undertaken in Washington, although the topic of entitlements, where the ultimate solution will eventually lie, is off the table for political reasons.

Against this backdrop the quality of US macro-economic data has improved greatly in recent weeks, justifying our stubborn insistence that the economy was not at risk of slipping back into recession. Our general outlook for the value of domestic equities therefore remains reasonably constructive despite the potential for violent political storms. We are much more concerned about those parts of the world in which intentional monetary tightening has accelerated the forced rationalization of credit. This is of particular immediate concern in most developing markets, where flat or inverted yield curves are abundant and credit growth is slowing precipitously from highly inflated levels.

It is during the cycle of monetary tightening that problems in credit dependent entities arise in capital markets. Recall that the European Central Bank, which we regard as one of the most inept institutions on this planet, embarked on a tightening course about ten minutes before Greek bonds collapsed. They displayed a similar sense of timing with an interest rate boost in the summer of 2008. To date, the Federal Reserve has been the easiest central bank in the developed world, which has allowed our capital markets to behave well in the face of great turbulence in the rest of the world. Although there are costs and dangers to their continuing ease, we would be very concerned if they were to move toward a more normal policy stance. That is the point at which the stresses in state and municipal credit would assert themselves in capital markets with the potential of provoking a disorderly exit from a very illiquid asset class, aka a panic.

With U.S. business in good financial shape and governments around the world not, we continue to maintain a reasonably constructive stance in the fund, with nearly all of the long side exposure in domestic equities. Short positions remain concentrated in foreign stocks and financial institutions, many of which are becoming wards of various states. We continue to hold a short position in a number of large emerging markets, including Brazil and India, both of which have seen a sharp deterioration in local economic data. Our negative position regarding the integrated financials is long standing; in addition to their legacy issues from the last crisis they are the largest owners of sovereign debt (now that the regulators forced it upon them, believing that to be the safest sector) and will be easy targets for greater and greater participation in any "voluntary" restructurings.

November 20, 2011
Michael C. Aronstein
President

The information provided herein represents the opinion of the Portfolio Manager and is not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results, nor investment advice.