MARKETFIELD
ASSET MANAGEMENT

MARKETFIELD FUND

December 31, 2017

Fund Overview

OBJECTIVE

The investment objective of the Fund is capital appreciation.

STRATEGY & PROCESS

The Fund seeks long-term growth of capital above that of the broad equity market over a full market cycle, with volatility that is generally lower than that of the broad equity market. Correlation between the Fund and the broad equity market may vary considerably over a full market cycle. The Fund has a broad investment charter that allows it to utilize equity securities, fixed income instruments, commodities, futures, and options. Additionally, the Fund may engage in short sales of securities using up to 50% of net assets to profit from an anticipated decline in the price of the security. The use of short selling could result in increased volatility of returns.

Fund Facts

CUSIP Class I	89834E245
CUSIP Class A	89834E278
CUSIP Class C	89834E252
CUSIP Class R6	89834E229
Inception Date	7/31/2007
Benchmark	S&P 500 Index
Net Assets	$474.1 million
Number of Holdings	76

Portfolio Allocation

(Excluding Cash) (As of 12/31/17)

Equity Long*	98.9%
Equity Short*	-27.6%
Fixed Income Long	0.2%

**Option deltas not reflected.*

Performance

Quarterly Average Annual Total Return As of 12/31/17

	Tickers	1 Mo	3 Mo	YTD	1 Yr	3 Yr	5 Yr	10 Yr	Since Inception
Class I	MFLDX	1.57%	6.08%	21.20%	21.20%	2.40%	1.95%	5.40%	5.56%
Class A (Max. 5.5% load)	MFADX	-4.06%	0.17%	14.18%	14.18%	0.25%	0.56%	4.56%	4.73%
Class A (NAV)	MFADX	1.53%	6.03%	20.83%	20.83%	2.16%	1.70%	5.15%	5.30%
Class C (Max. 1.0% CDSC)	MFCDX	0.47%	4.88%	19.00%	19.00%	1.39%	0.93%	4.36%	4.51%
Class R6	MFRIX	1.56%	6.17%	21.37%	21.37%	2.56%	2.07%	5.47%	5.62%
S&P 500® Index	SPXT	1.11%	6.64%	21.83%	21.83%	11.41%	15.79%	8.50%	8.33%

Class I Inception Date is 7/31/07. Class A Inception Date is 10/5/12, Class C Inception Date is 10/5/12 and Class R6 Inception Date is 6/17/13. S&P 500® Index since inception returns are as of Class I inception date of 7/31/07.

Performance data quoted represents past performance. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Due to market volatility, current performance may be less or higher than the figures shown. Investment return and principal value will fluctuate, so that upon redemption, shares may be worth more or less than their original cost. For performance information current to the most recent month-end, visit our web site at http://www.marketfield.com/fund/.

Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses are: Class I: 2.66%, Class A: 2.91%, Class C: 3.67%, and Class R6: 2.64%. Expenses include Dividend Expense on Securities Sold Short and Broker Fees and Charges on Short Sales.

Performance data for the classes varies based on differences in their fee and expense structures. The performance figures for Class I shares reflect the historical performance of the then-existing shares of MainStay Marketfield Fund (the predecessor to the Fund, for which the Adviser served as the investment sub-advisor) for periods from October 5, 2012 to April 8, 2016. The performance figures for Class I shares also reflect the historical performance of the then-existing shares of the predecessor fund to MainStay Marketfield Fund (which was subject to a different fee structure, and for which a predecessor entity to the Adviser served as the investment adviser)for periods prior to October 5, 2012. The returns in the table below for periods prior to October 5, 2012 have been calculated using the expenses of the predecessor fund to the MainStay Marketfield Fund. Performance figures for Class A and Class C shares, first offered on October 5, 2012, include the historical performance of Class I shares through October 4, 2012 and are adjusted to reflect differences in fees and expenses. Performance figures for Class R6 shares, first offered on June 17, 2013, include the historical performance of Class I shares through June 16, 2013. Performance data for the classes varies based on differences in their fee and expense structures. The returns in the table above for periods prior to October 5, 2012 have been calculated using the expenses of the predecessor fund to the MainStay Marketfield Fund. Performance data for the classes varies based on differences in their fee and expense structures. Unadjusted, the performance for the newer classes would likely have been different because of differences in certain fees and expenses attributable to each share class.

Regions Exposure *(As of 12/31/17)*

	Long	Short	Net
U.S	47.50	-27.60	19.90%
Emerging Markets	27.20	0.00	27.20%
Europe	13.10	0.00	13.10%
Japan	5.40	0.00	5.40%
China	3.30	0.00	3.30%
Australia	1.70	0.00	1.70%
Canada	0.70	0.00	0.70%

Portfolio Management

Michael C. Aronstein
President, Chief Investment Officer
Portfolio Manager
Marketfield Asset Management LLC

Michael Shaoul
Chairman, CEO
Portfolio Manager
Marketfield Asset Management LLC

Sectors Net Exposure



Before You Invest

Before considering an investment in the Fund, you should understand that you could lose money.

The Fund regularly makes short sales of securities, which involves the risk that losses may exceed the original amount invested. The Fund may also use options and futures contracts, which have the risks of unlimited losses of the underlying holdings due to unanticipated market movements and failure to correctly predict the direction of securities prices, interest rates, and currency exchange rates. However, a mutual fund investor's risk is limited to the amount invested in a fund. Investments in absolute return strategies are not intended to outperform stocks and bonds during strong market rallies.

Foreign securities are subject to interest rate, currency exchange rate, economic, and political risks. These risks may be greater for emerging markets. Investing in smaller companies involves special risks, including higher volatility and lower liquidity. Investing in mid-cap stocks may carry more risk than investing in stocks of larger, more well-established companies. This risk is usually greater for longer-term debt securities. Investment by the Fund in lower-rated and non-rated securities presents a greater risk of loss to principal and interest than higher-rated securities. Investments in asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities involve additional risks such as credit risk, prepayment risk, possible illiquidity and default, and increased susceptibility to adverse economic developments. The Fund involves the risk that the macroeconomic trends identified by portfolio management will not come to fruition and their advantageous duration may not last as long as portfolio management forecasts. The Fund may invest in derivatives, which may increase the volatility of the Fund's NAV and may result in a loss to the Fund.

Notional value is the total value of a leveraged position's assets. Correlation is a statistical measure of the degree to which the movements of two variables (stock/option/convertible prices or returns) are related. Option Delta is the relationship between the option price and the underlying price, which reflects the sensitivity of the price of the option to changes in the price of the underlying security.

The S&P 500® Index is a trademark of McGraw Hill Financial Inc. The S&P 500® Index is widely regarded as the standard index for measuring large-cap U.S. stock market performance. The securities holdings and volatility of the Fund differ significantly from the stocks that make up the S&P 500 Index. An investment cannot be made directly into an index.

Regions and Sectors Exposures are subject to change and are not recommendations to buy or sell any security. Only equities and equity instruments classified in Regions and Sectors Exposures. Options premiums, and not delta exposure, are used in Sectors and Regions Exposures, when applicable. Options premiums, and not delta exposure, are used in Sectors and Regions Exposures, when applicable. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS®) was developed by and/or is the exclusive property of MSCI, Inc. and Standard & Poor Financial Services LLC ("S&P"). GICS is a service mark of MSCI and S&P and has been licensed for use by U.S. Bancorp Fund Services, LLC.

Diversification does not assure a profit nor protect against loss in a declining market.

For more information about Marketfield Fund, call 800-311-6583 for a prospectus or summary prospectus. Investors are asked to consider the investment objectives, risks, and charges and expenses of the investment carefully before investing. The prospectus or summary prospectus contains this and other information about the investment company. Please read the prospectus or summary prospectus carefully before investing.

The Marketfield Fund is managed by Marketfield Asset Management LLC and distributed by Quasar Distributors, LLC.

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Commentary

Chairman's Report December 2017

The Fund's portfolio generated a return of 21.20% for the whole of 2017, almost matching the S&P 500 (SPX) index's 21.83% total return and we view this 97% capture rate as strong performance for a long/short mandate. Although our overall 2017 performance was very close to the SPX index, our performance over shorter time frames diverged significantly. This reflects the fact that the portfolio employed in 2017 differed quite significantly from the make-up of the SPX index, with a high weighting to foreign securities and a U.S. allocation that was concentrated on Materials, Housing, Industrials and Defense, with a small weighting to Technology, and short positions in Real Estate, Utilities, Consumer Staples and Healthcare.

Our average exposure during 2017 was approximately 70%, underlining the degree of out performance by our chosen allocations. Most importantly, 2017 marks the first time in a number of years that we have reaped the benefit of positioning the portfolio into areas of global markets that were less than popular, and then benefited as market sentiment turned in our direction. The majority of these investment decisions were actually made during 2016 when we deliberately tilted the portfolio to benefit from a period of broad improvement in the global economy. It took a while for many of these positions to appreciate in value, and as a result our portfolio declined -3.36% during 2016 (although it did increase in value during the last half of the year). It is therefore ironic that our investment record will make us look smarter in 2017 than the year in which most of the hard decisions were taken, but this is often the nature with portfolio returns. In any case we are obviously pleased to have repaired a good portion of our 2014-16 draw-down over the course of 2017.

With regards to our U.S. exposure, housing related equities were a standout performer, with industrials, defense, commodity related and technology all contributing nicely. U.S. shorts in Utilities and Healthcare appreciated, while Real Estate was a notable laggard. Although a majority of our short positions cost money in 2017, they mostly appreciated by much less than the overall SPX index, and a number of Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) positions actually declined in value. We continue to view commercial real estate as the likely leader of the next downturn and maintain it as the largest sector allocation on the short side. The remainder of our short book is designed for the potential to benefit either from a move higher by interest rates (this was only true of short dated rates in 2017) or a shift away from defensive equities.

Emerging market exposure generated strong returns, with both currency and equity market appreciation contributing to gains. One notable change over the course of 2017 was the degree to which emerging market performance broadened from being driven almost entirely by the large technology sector to a wider process of appreciation. We also started to see a more typical correlation between commodity and emerging market returns, which again indicates a hardening of belief in the global reflation cycle (not to be confused with the "Trump reflation" trade that dominated allocations at the end of 2016). European holdings declined slightly in Q4 but performed well over the course of 2017 as a whole, while Japan finished the year on a strong note generating the majority of the year's gains in the final quarter.

Given the performance of the portfolio during 2017 we made few changes to positions over the course of the year. Most of the decisions we took were driven by a wish to keep allocations consistent, and strong appreciation in single name positions allowed us to take some profits and reallocate elsewhere.

For the long side of our portfolio, we remain concentrated on economically sensitive sectors in the U.S. and cyclically sensitive markets elsewhere. Our large emerging market exposure has a bias towards Asia, and is complementary to our position in Japan. European exposure is split between economically sensitive large cap equities and a position in European banks, which is positively correlated to changes in local interest rates. The portfolio's currency exposure is completely unhedged, reflecting our belief that the USD peaked in early 2017 and is now in a bear market.

As our commentary makes clear, we continue to see room for the global economy and corporate sector to meet or beat investor

Commentary (continued)

expectations and although a number of central banks are likely to change course during 2018, they remain remarkably far behind the progress being shown by their underlying economies. The short side of our portfolio remains tilted to sectors that would come under pressure should global growth generate shortages of key goods and services, with our commercial real estate positions underpinned by a belief that office and residential markets in a number of key metropolitan areas are starting to see excess supply drive rental values lower.

January 24, 2018

Michael Shaoul

Chairman, CEO & Portfolio Manager

With the first inaugural anniversary of our 45th President at hand, Washington is recovering from its second "Bomb Cyclone" of the past year. This most recent one does not play golf or use social media, although it did visit Florida early on.

Upheavals within politics and diplomacy are the order of the day. Established norms of rhetoric and procedure have given way to unfiltered, intemperate and impolitic discourse. The tone blends closing time at a dive bar with unsupervised recess.

Abnormalities in politics are consistent with disruptive changes occurring across business and society. Existing structures are being undermined by boundless access to raw information and constant, direct communication links among individuals. Secrets are dragged into the spotlight of transparency. Common knowledge among insiders does not stay inside.

Established norms, whether social, commercial or econometric, are rapidly becoming obsolete as bases for context and perspective. Entire industries are faced with the need to restructure and, in many cases, abandon the basic premises that have guided their efforts for decades.

Retail is an easy exemplar. The goal of maintaining gross margins has been fundamental to the retail trade for generations. The advent of large scale discounters in the 1960s and 1970s modified the accepted strategic wisdom of the industry, but the main effect was at the lower end of the quality spectrum.

Forty years ago, very few consumers knew the actual spread between wholesale costs and retail selling prices. Retailers had a strong incentive to guard this data and prohibit suppliers and manufacturers from selling directly to the public. Today's consumer can access pricing data across the distribution chain for most consumer goods. In this day and age successful merchants are willing to operate on slender margins to capture growing volumes and, in certain cases, recurring subscription or membership fees.

It is clear that intermediaries in general are seeing their value eroded by technologies that enable direct links between principals in economic, social and political interaction. The pressures arising from disintermediation and attendant declines of position, power and effectiveness are weighing on governments and public sector institutions across the world. The diminished regard for traditional sources of authority and the institutional structures through which they act is a natural consequence of their innate rigidity and lack of adaptability.

Markets and private organizations are rapidly proliferating outside the boundaries of regulators and traditional political oversight. Among the many consequences of this secular trend is a growing inability among official bodies to accurately collect and analyze data pertaining to private economic activity. Techniques developed decades ago are being utilized in an attempt to capture the state of modern commerce and economic life. From our perspective, they are failing at every turn.

The distorted pictures of economic conditions from official sources are of particular consequence in this day and age. As quantitative techniques have come to dominate investment practice, the models at their core need nourishment from statistical inputs. These inputs are taken and processed at face value. Econometric models do not agonize over the quality of their feedstock. Statistical versions of "fake news" are swallowed digitally—hook, line and sinker.

Commentary (continued)

The possibility of fundamental flaws in official economic data is of particular import for purposes of capital allocation. Misleading pictures of aggregate output, demand, resource utilization and prices can drive capital flows towards inappropriate and dangerous venues. The risks are greatest at points of inflection in major trends.

We have argued that functionally limitless pools of liquid assets, sired by central bank policy, introduce the possibility of disruptive inflation in real economic exchange.

To date, most of the inflation has been confined to capital assets (bonds in particular), luxury consumption goods and those services where government inefficiency or subsidy distorts market forces. Inflation in these areas bears only slightly, if at all, on the price indices used by central banks to gauge the propriety of their actions.

The exclusion of asset prices from models intending to assess the risks arising from monetary excesses is a fatal error in the theoretical basis of modern central banking, and accounts for the persistent failure to recognize destabilizing forces before they provoke crises.

Monetary policy is directly influential in asset pricing, particularly in markets where demand can be amplified by credit. Ordinary consumption goods are, at best, derivatively responsive to changes in monetary policy. Responses that occur are substantially lagged.

At the root of inflationary cycles that resolve in crisis is artificial, credit driven demand for some asset or enterprise. The lure of easy capital gains amplified by credit is most dangerous when the objects of affection are regarded as safe and inherently stable. A veneer of certainty allows otherwise reasonable people to borrow recklessly against inflating assets.

This process allowed for ten-fold leverage in stocks in 1929, commodities in 1980, Japanese property in 1989 and single family homes in 2006. With the exception of the commodity cycle that ended in 1980, none of the major crises following these asset inflations was signaled by a parallel expansion of consumer price indices. By focusing on prices of consumer goods and services, central bankers missed the major, systemic risks.

Expansive monetary and credit conditions can fuel consumer goods inflation when imbalances between supply and demand develop in critical sectors of the economy. Because normal consumption demands for food, fuel, entertainment, clothing and the like are fairly inertial, price shocks are normally the result of supply shortfalls. Exceptions arise when a good that is usually bought for consumption purposes is, because of an apparent propensity to inflate, re-categorized as a promising investment medium. Investors amplify normal consumption demand, overwhelming existing supplies and driving prices beyond precedent. The process of adding leveraged investment demand to the demand of actual users was responsible for the distortions in housing prices and mortgage credit that ended in tears a decade ago. As the price of homes is not included in accepted measures of inflation, the risks attendant as the housing market inflated were largely ignored by monetary authorities until disaster struck.

A less dramatic cycle involving commodities unfolded between 2002 and 2016. After a period in which China and other major emerging markets enjoyed robust inflows of liquidity and permanent capital, their demands for raw materials drove a steady increase in the majority of commodity sectors. Investors seized on these trends to proclaim commodities a distinct asset class warranting passive, long-term exposure.

The addition of institutional demand for broad groups of raw materials prompted inflationary surges in 2007 and again in 2011. As the exuberance and fundamentals in emerging economies began to wane in 2011, a five year deflation of commodity prices set in. Pressures were amplified by the withdrawal of disappointed investment capital on top of the excess capacity developed in response to record prices.

Traditional inflation measures are influenced by commodity price movements to a meaningful degree. Commodity deflation between 2011 and 2016 acted to suppress global indices of consumer and industrial prices, reinforcing policy makers' concerns about acute deflationary risks.

A decade of central bank expansion has, thus far, been reflected mainly in asset price inflation. We see the inflationary impulse now migrating to portions of the economy that affect traditional gauges of inflation. Unpleasant surprises loom for central bankers and the cohort of investors convinced that unmanageable inflation is a trivial risk.

Commentary (continued)

Asset inflations are the initial and most dangerous symptoms of monetary excess. The large scale deflations that wreak havoc on economic function originate in collapsing investment speculations and the destruction of financial systems that follow. From the South Sea Bubble, to the Crash of 1929, the Japanese real estate mania of the late 1980s and the housing deflation of the past decade, the type of deflation so feared by central bankers does not originate with disturbances in Consumer Price Index (CPI) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price indices, but in collapses of specific asset markets inflated by leveraged investment flows.

Speculative inflations in equities during the 1920s and housing in 2001-2007 were not accompanied by commensurate increases in consumer prices. Nonetheless, both proved more dangerous than the double digit rises in CPI that seems to preoccupy central bankers.

Asset inflation can only be joined by inflation in consumer goods and services to the extent that underlying supply and demand fundamentals allow. A structurally oversupplied market will not respond to monetary stimulus until that market returns to balance, much to the frustration of central banks. Their struggles to reanimate the deflated remnants of the last credit cycle and normalize the economic distortions left in its wake are unceasing, though futile.

The vectors through which monetary inflation moves beyond asset prices to consumer prices vary from cycle to cycle. Widespread effects occur when general factors of production and distribution cannot satisfy prevailing demand. Supply is then rationed by higher prices.

The migration of higher prices from sector to sector proceeds at different rates in different parts of the economy depending on local conditions of supply and demand. Effects are invariably uneven, and therein lies the problem.

If inflationary conditions simply raised price levels in every corner of an economy, the process might be considered relatively benign. The twin perils of misallocated capital and unequal distributions of income and wealth would be ameliorated if price increases arose uniformly. Sadly, this is never the outcome in real life.

Monetary and credit expansions crystallize around particular activities and assets. These, in turn, enjoy extraordinary, unnatural increases in profitability and real prices. People involved in inflating sectors, whether purposefully or by good fortune, reap disproportionate rewards and unfettered access to capital and investment. Social, economic and international relations are distorted by the exaggerated behaviors that follow.

At present, the inflationary process arising from record monetary accommodation has been focused on financial assets. Owners and handlers of securities have seen dramatic increases in nominal and relative wealth. Property in financial centers, luxury goods and symbols of financial standing have inflated in tandem.

Fuel for the process has been supplied by a combination of historic lows in real and nominal interest rates, record demand for long-term bonds and a fivefold increase in global monetary reserves (10x the rise in global GDP) over the past 15 years.

Resentment among those not partaking of the inflationary prosperity has intensified. The normal human inclination to judge one's position in relative rather than absolute terms has energized political narratives that emphasize the role of state power in allocating the spoils of asset inflation. Increasingly popular but mistaken academic theories suggest that markets cannot function for the general well-being without constant restraint from political authorities. The chimera of "market failure" is invoked to justify interventions in markets where regulatory or political intrusion has impaired proper function. Price controls that provoke shortages are ignored when regulators insist that the market has failed and requires intervention.

We are finally at the stage of this cycle where monetary inflation in developed economies is progressing from asset prices to prices of goods and services. A common, crucial output factor is finally becoming scarce across a broad section of advanced economies.

A structural shortage of labor is at hand. The trend is supported by a mix of demographics, growing local opportunities in emerging economies (China in particular) and the aversion to immigration arising in many Western societies. The proposed wall between the U.S. and Mexico may be turned into a recruiting center before this decade is out.

Intensifying competition for labor will drive real wages steadily higher, undermining businesses that depend on ample access to inexpensive employees. Service providers are at particular risk, reliant on local employment and unable to outsource or automate many mundane but critical tasks.

Commentary (continued)

Outcomes for individual businesses will depend upon their ability to either raise prices or increase output per employee (productivity) sufficiently to offset higher employment costs. During the explosive rise in oil prices in the 1970s, utilities, consumer cyclicals and consumer staples (among others) were unable to offset input costs with price increases—margins compressed, profitability disappeared and the stocks were decimated.

The dynamics of labor scarcity will give rise to similar, widespread disparities in business and stock performance across entire economies. Companies with loosely attached, semi-permanent workforces will be forced to offer more hours, regular schedules, higher pay and benefits. Firm's offering compensation sufficient to bring about employee stability will be positioned to press their advantages over competitors grappling with constant turnover.

Pressures on labor supply will be exacerbated by coincident accelerations in infrastructure spending by government, capital expenditures by companies flush with repatriated cash and generous outlays by foreign leaders desperate to quell discontent among their citizens.

Fiscal stimulus, largely absent for the first portion of this cycle, will be a feature of the next several years. The Keynesian choristers howling for fiscal expansion will finally get their wish, although most have now taken to decrying larger deficits that lower tax rates might bring.

Labor shortages, as with insufficiences of any critical input factor, have the effect of reducing useful capacity. Utilization figures that tally physical assets can be extremely misleading if too few workers are available to bring idle capacity on line. Inflation models incorporating capacity utilization numbers can be turned upside down when exogenous factors limit output.

From a practical standpoint, the macroeconomic and market effects will be widespread. Central banks will continue to downplay price disturbances and inflationary stresses. Signs of wage inflation will be widely applauded.

Fixed income investors will take their cues and comfort from the complacency of central bankers. Overwhelming evidence and considerable pain will be required to change the secular outlook for bonds. Both may be on the way.

For equity investors, the prospect of contraction in aggregate margins and multiples will make stock selection more challenging. Pricing power and efficiency will be primary factors.

Manufacturers should, in general, have an easier time in the environment that we foresee. In contrast to service providers, goods producers can readily take advantage of advances in production, distribution and management technologies that raise productivity. Our portfolio has been heavily tilted towards global manufacturers for several years.

Flows away from "safe havens" have pressured the dollar and boosted the nominal profitability of exporters. Dollar-based investors have benefited from overseas currency exposures while emerging market economies have been helped by reductions in the real cost of servicing dollar denominated debts. These macroeconomic trends continue to underlie the main areas of emphasis in our portfolio, as they have for the past several years.

January 24, 2018

Michael C. Aronstein

President, CIO & Portfolio Manager

The foregoing represents the opinions of the Chairman, CEO & Portfolio Manager and of the President, CIO & Portfolio Manager, respectively, and are not intended to be a forecast of future events, a guarantee of future results, or investment advice.

Capture rate shows you whether a given fund has outperformed, gained more or lost less than a broad market benchmark during periods of market strength and weakness.

The spread is the difference between the buying and selling price.